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Many ideas of medieval logicians became well-known recently and are not considered nowadays 
as something just archaic and old-fashioned. Medieval logicians elaborated difficult and specific 
language that sometimes is interpreted as an extremely sophisticated and non-natural one. 
Medieval ideas are partly determined by the boundaries of this sophisticated language but they 
can be useful for modern research. 
This presentation deals with the concept of truth and its interpretation in the 13-14 centuries. 
Some scholastic authors (for example, T. Bradwardine) wrote that proposition is true when the 
things are the same as they are signified in this proposition. Signification was a relation that 
described how a real thing and a term are connected. The term signifies a real thing (in other 
words, it is a sign of that thing and the result of cognition). The notion of signification was 
disputable among scholars: there were different definitions of signification, different descriptions 
of cognition and etc. Then the concept of truth was defined by the property of supposition (it was 
especiallв important part of Buridan‟s and Ockham‟s logics). The propositions is true when a 
subject and a predicate supposit for the same thing. Thus, the truth-conditions of different types 
of categorical propositions were determined by supposition (roughly said, the relation which is 
close to reference). Buridan understood by a cause of truth „whatever is enough for the 
proposition to be true‟. However, there are some challenges with supposition: what does it mean 
that the term supposit something? Is supposition always depend on the signification? That 
epistemological foundations has this property? Etc. Buridan and Ockham assert that the 
proposition can be true only when it exists. The proposition is not a some ideal abstract thing, it is 
a sign that can have different nature – written, spoken or mental. Thus, if the proposition is 
neither a spoken and written word, nor a mental term, according to Ockham an Buridan, it does 
not exist. For them logic and grammar are not distinct yet, the language of logic is a nature 
language. This understanding of truth influences on the conception of consequence and 
interpretation of paradox. In my presentation I will suggest detailed description and 
reconstruction of this account. Situation become interesting when we deal with tensed and modal 
proposition. Is it proper to understand “supposition ” as a „theorв of reference‟ and, thus, is it 
proper to make the conclusion that medieval theory of truth is the theory of reference? Medieval 
truth-theory is not a correspondence theory of truth and that step is very important. 
The main idea of this presentation is to show how the medieval conception of truth works by 
considering the idea of insolubilia (e.x., epistemic and logical paradoxes) and the conditions of 
modal and rensed propositions. The authors which are the ground of the research mainly are 
Burley, Buridan and Ockham. 
                                                     
1
 Иɫɫɥɟɞɨɜаɧɢɟ ɨɫɭщɟɫɬɜɥɟɧɨ ɜ ɪаɦɤаɯ Пɪɨɝɪаɦɦɵ ɮɭɧɞаɦɟɧɬаɥɶɧɵɯ ɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜаɧɢɣ НИУ ВШЭ ɜ 2016 ɝɨɞɭ. 
77
